Polyopic heautoscopy: Case report and review of the literature by Brugger, Peter et al.
INTRODUCTION
Autoscopic hallucinations and heautoscopy are
two variants of a reduplication of one’s own body
and self (Blanke et al., 2004; Bradford, 2005;
Brugger et al., 1997). In the former, an exact
mirror image of oneself, occasionally only of one’s
face or bust, is perceived visually (Maillard et al.,
2004; Zamboni et al., 2005). Such hallucinations
are usually of very brief duration and often
accompanied by other types of visual hallucinations
or illusions. In the latter variant, i.e. heautoscopy
proper, a person is confronted with his or her
double, or doppelgänger, which may or may not
mirror the person’s appearance. Regardless of its
visual features, the hallucinatory figure is felt to be
a double of one’s self. The feeling of belonging
toward one’s double is usually accompanied by
alterations in bodily awareness; for example, the
person feels an unusual lightness of the body,
experiences vestibular illusions, or describes a
feeling of detachment. Frequently, heautoscopic
echopraxia, i.e., the imitation of bodily movements
by the double, gives rise to the illusion that it is
the doppelgänger that “contains the real mind”
(e.g., Lukianowicz, 1958, cases A and D; Dewhurst
and Pearson, 1955, cases 1 and 2; Brugger et al.,
1994). Echopractic movements may sometimes
follow actual body movements with a time lag
(e.g., Lance, 1976), an observation also reported in
patients with supernumerary phantom limbs (Hari
et al., 1998) and supporting the notion of the
doppelgänger as a “phantom of the entire body”
(Brugger, 2006). There is considerable variation in
the reported duration of heautoscopy; it may last
for seconds or for hours, and even cases of the
double as a steady companion are not exceptional
(Conrad, 1953; Engerth and Hoff, 1929; Pearson
and Dewhurst, 1954). Heautoscopy has been
described in a broad range of neurological
disorders such as epilepsy, migraine, neoplasia,
infarction, and infection (Menninger-Lerchenthal,
1935, 1946; Lippman, 1953; Devinsky et al., 1989;
Dening and Berrios, 1994; Brugger et al., 1997),
and also in pychiatric disorders such as
schizophrenia, depression, anxiety, and dissociative
disorders (Bychowski, 1943; Carp, 1952; Todd and
Dewhurst, 1955; Lukianowicz, 1958; Damas Mora
et al., 1980; Dening and Berrios, 1994). Based on
an analysis of autoscopic phenomena after focal
brain lesions, Blanke et al. (2002, 2004)
emphasized the specific importance of lesions at
the temporo-occipito-parietal junction. While
autoscopic hallucinations have almost exclusively
been reported in neuropsychiatric patients,
heautoscopy also occurs in the healthy population,
especially in the framework of a preoccupation
with one’s own self and its place in the world or as
a pathological grief reaction (Menninger-
Lerchenthal, 1935; Hécaen and de Ajuriaguerra,
1952; Wells, 1983; Dening and Berrios, 1994).
Among both types of autoscopic phenomena,
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“polyopic” cases, involving a multiplication rather
than simply the reduplication of one’s own body,
have been reported. Probably the first account of
polyopic heautoscopy is to be found in Müller’s
(1826/1967) seminal work on visual hallucinations.
Returning home late from work, an exhausted
university professor suddenly found himself
confronted with some 15 persons, all clearly
recognized as doubles of himself although they
were of different ages and wore clothes he himself
only wore in the past. A case of an autoscopic
hallucination with multiple images is reported by
Roubinovitch (1893; cited by Parish, 1894 p. 16),
whose patient saw three identical mirror images of
himself which he compared with the reflections he
would have seen standing in front of a mirror with
three wings. Passing reference to other early cases
of a polyopic nature can be found in Winston
(1908), Oesterreich (1910), Schneider (1931),
Nadeau (1972), and in Leischner’s (1961) review
article on autoscopic phenomena. While these early
cases have a somewhat anecdotal character, our
Table I summarizes certain features of polyopic
autoscopy/heautoscopy as described in more detail
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in the medical-psychological literature. Out-of-body
experiences, conceptually closely related to
heautoscopy (Blanke et al., 2004; Brugger et al.,
1997) can also involve an illusory multiplication of
one’s body. Cases of such multiple out-of-body
experiences are reviewed in Green (1967, 1983).
Tschaikowskaja (1982) discusses the motif of the
multiple self-portrait in the visual arts. Multiple
doubles in folklore are considered in Krauss (1920)
and Panoff (1968).
The 14 instances of polyopic autoscopic
phenomena noted in Table I may be characterized
as follows. Eight patients were female (57%) and 6
male (43%). Their mean age was 38.9 years
(range: 12-62 years). With respect to etiology, 64%
of the cases of polyopic heautoscopy were of
neurological origin and 29% of psychiatric origin
[1 case (7%) was during puerpurium]. Of the
neurological cases, 88% were of focal origin and
due to a traumatic lesion, vascular infarction, or
focal epilepsy. Of these focal neurological cases
the lesion was localized as often in the right as in
the left hemisphere. Either two or three doubles
were noted in 43% of cases; more numerous
TABLE I
Characteristics of 14 published cases of polyopic autoscopic phenomena
Case Source Patient Etiology Key contents of autoscopic experience# (chronological order) (sex, age)
1. Staudenmaier (1912/1968) Male, n.r. Schizophrenia Patient sees 3 identical doubles in front of himself. “They stood 
(Ahlenstiel, 1949) still whenever I stood still, lifted their arms whenever I did”
2. Storch (1924) Female, 34 Schizophrenia Patient sees “seven forms coming out of me, one after the other
[...]. They all looked like me; they did what I had in my thoughts”
3. Mayer-Gross (1928) Female, n.r. Psychosis Depressed patient sees a crying double of herself. She closes her
eyes, and, after reopening them, sees the entire room crowded with
doubles, all identically looking and all crying
4. Ehrenwald (1930) Male, 52 Posterior left Patient identifies himself with a motionless giant double on which 
hemisphere infarction many additional but tiny doubles are climbing around
5. Ley and Stauder (1950) Male, n.r. Encephalitis in the Patient sees and feels three identical doubles of himself lying to 
(case 2) course of M. Bang his left side. Delusional elaboration; transitivism
6. Dewhurst and Pearson Male, 57 Post-traumatic In his left visual field, the patient sees “crowds of tiny figures 
(1955); Russel and Whitty epilepsy; right [head and shoulders, only], all the colors of the rainbow – all 
(1955) temporal lobe lesion myself”
7. Hécaen and Badaraco (1956) Male, n.r. Tuberculous Patient is lying on his side and sees two identical doubles, one in 
(case 50); also in Hécaen meningitis the left and one in the right visual field. Feels that both doubles 
and Green (1957) (case 4) possess some body weight
8. Klages (1959) (case 1) Male, 54 Gunshot lesion left Patient feels split into three persons. The actual self observes two 
parietal lobe; other selves represented by the left and right body halves, 
macrosomatognosia; respectively
depersonalization
9. Heintel (1965) Female, 32 Post-traumatic Patient sees multiple mirror images of herself in different sizes. 
epilepsy; right-sided Autoscopic images are localized in the interior of the patient’s 
hemianopia body
10. Craske and Sacks (1969) Female, 32 Healthy (during Patient sees a non-pregnant double straight ahead of herself. A
puerperium) second double covers her body “like a mask but [is] separated
from it by a thin layer”
11. Lance (1976) Female, 62 Right occipital “Five or six” doubles imitate the patient’s actions she herself had 
infarction performed “a short time beforehand”
12. Sengoku et al. (1981) Female, 33 Temporal lobe As an ictal experience, patient sees two doubles of herself, one 
epilepsy; right-sided with convulsions, the other supplying a handkerchief to wipe 
focus patient’s saliva with
13. Kamiya and Okamoto Female, 21 Focal epilepsy; Patient sees “multiple selves as shadows moving from left to right 
(1982) left-sided focus in visual space”
14. Chabrol and Bonnet Female, 12 Panic attacks with Patient feels threatened by several identically looking doubles
(1995) Capgras syndrome
doubles were evident in 57% of cases. In some
reports, the doubles filled the entire room (Mayer-
Gross, 1928) or, rather exceptionally, the interior of
the patient’s body (Heintel, 1965). In cases where
polyopic heautoscopy was characterized by a large
number of doubles, these were generally seen as
quite small in size (Ehrenwald, 1930; Dewhurst
and Pearson, 1955), whereas a small number of
doubles was associated with a size comparable to
that of the patient. Echopraxia was noted in two
reports listed in Table I. In one case it was
simultaneous with the patient’s actual movements
(Staudenmaier, 1912/1968), and in the other there
was a delayed imitation (Lance, 1976). Generally,
the doubles were localized in the central visual
field or immediately in front of the patient’s body
(85%), and continuous lateralization in the visual
field/peripersonal space was described in only two
cases (Dewhurst and Pearson, 1955; Ley and
Stauder, 1950). If mentioned at all, the perceived
distances to the doppelgänger were generally
small, i.e. they were localized within or just
beyond grasping distance, which is the rule in
heautoscopy. Yet, most reports (69%) did not
indicate any precise distance.
We present here one more case of polyopic
heautoscopy that is informative in several respects.
The patient’s five doubles were confined to the
right hemispace, and this experience was preceded
by the sensation of a split of the two halves of his
body along the midline. There was no similarity
between the doubles’ and the patient’s visual
appearance; two doubles were male, three were
female. The unique feature of the present case is
that the extent to which the patient identified
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himself with the single illusory figures diminished
with increasing perceived distance from his body.
CASE REPORT
PH (fictitious initials, for ‘Polyopic
Heautoscopy’), a 41-year-old right-handed pottery
maker, was seen at our clinic for presurgical
evaluation after three months of fatigue and dizziness
and recurrent seizures with gustatory sensations
and inappetence. On admission, neurological
examination revealed, apart from a very mild right-
sided sensory hemisyndrome, no positive findings. In
particular, position sense was normal, and there was
no visual field defect (Goldmann perimetry).
Electroencephalography (EEG) showed spikes,
spike-waves, and sharp waves as well as pathological
slowing over the left fronto-temporal region.
Neuropsychological examination revealed the
following: The patient was fully oriented; his sole
spontaneous complaints concerned memory problems
and tiredness. He presented with an elevated mood
(no affect lability) with anosodiaphoria. He had a
normal digit span, implicit and explicit verbal
learning were intact, active recall after one hour was,
however, reduced (spared recognition). Recall of the
Rey complex figure was quantitatively sufficient, but
drawn with repetitious elements. Receptive and
productive language functions were normal, but there
was a marked logorrhoea during spontaneous speech.
There were neither apraxias nor any deficits of visual
perception. Cognitive flexibility (verbal and figural
fluency), suppression of interference (Stroop task)
and conceptual shifting were normal. 
Fig. 1 – Computed tomography (coronal and transverse section) showing a space-occupying hyopodense lesion in the left temporal
lobe. Contrast enhancement showed a central vascularized solid part. Note that the surrounding edema extended into the parietal and
frontal lobe. These radiological data are compatible with a temporal neoplasia with an insular origin.
Computed tomography (CT) indicated an
expansive lesion in the left insula extending into
adjacent fronto-temporal cortex compatible with an
astrocytoma (Figure 1).
Among the first manifestations of his illness the
patient recalled the following incident: Upon
awakening one night he noticed that he had split
into three distinct parts: (1) the left half of his
body which felt quite normal; (2) the right half,
which felt detached from the left both physically
and emotionally; and (3) he observed “a man” in
close proximity to his right side. To a confusing
degree he felt this man to be a part of himself. It
was as if he and the man were “sharing the same
soul”. This feeling was convincing despite the fact
that there was no similarity in physical appearance
(for instance, the man was blond, while the
patient’s hair was black). Puzzled, but not
frightened, by this altered bodily awareness, the
patient began to walk up and down in his bedroom.
He repeatedly tried to catch a glimpse of the man
to his right in order to check whether, in
accordance with his feelings of identity with him,
the man’s face would also look like his own. As he
did so, he at once discovered what he later spoke
of as “the family”. His account (c.f., Figure 2):
“When I walked around, I repeatedly looked
towards the gentleman on my side and wondered if
I could recognize his face. This was impossible
since on looking towards the right side he also
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turned his head to the right. I could note, however,
that the man was blonde and about 50-years-old.
Once more trying to get a close look of him, I all
of a sudden noticed that, even more to the right,
there was a whole group of people. At a distance of
2 meters I saw an approximately 50-year-old lady
with blond braids. Still another 4 meters away,
there were two girls (both approximately age 20)
and some 20 meters from me, still in a straight line
with all the other persons, there was a boy
(unspecified age). I knew right from the beginning
that these persons were intimately linked with one
another, they were father, mother, daughters and
son.” (In actuality, the patient’s wife was younger
than him and had dark short hair. His only two
children were two sons, aged 10 and 16).
PH said that, with the appearance of the
“family”, the previously evident space between the
left and right halves of his body ceased to exist.
While he continued to feel a strong sense of
belonging towards the man at his right side, on
discovery of the other persons this sense gradually
expanded to include the woman and, to a lesser
extent, the girls. The boy, who “played a very minor
role in the whole series of events”, was eventually
only vaguely seen and at certain times vanished in
the darkness of the far right end of the bedroom.
Referring to his remark about his “son” standing at
a distance of 20 meters, we asked PH about the
actual size of his bedroom. He insisted that 20
meters appeared a realistic estimate at that time; to
his right, the entire room including single pieces of
furniture was notably extended into the distance.
All “family” members imitated PH’s every
movement. When PH was sitting down, “man” and
“lady” were sitting down as well (Figure 2). The
“daughters” and the “son” were also able to move
independently; their positions in space (i.e., their
distance to PH’s body) remained invariant,
however. PH was impressed by the synchronization
of his and the other persons’ motor activity and, as
a deliberate experiment; he successfully tried to
influence their movements by, for example, doing
push-ups.
“When I walked, the family walked with me;
when I bent my knees, the others bent theirs; when
I looked to the right, so did all the others.
Exceptionally, however, the girls, who were
commonly talking to one another, would look
towards me waving their hands as if inviting me to
join their world. [...] Naturally, I could not see the
persons any longer on closing my eyes, but the
feeling remained that pieces of myself were located
in precisely those places I knew the persons were
standing. It was a feeling of being awfully frittered
away!”.
When the patient’s actual wife was sitting at his
right side, the “family” would temporarily vanish,
and simultaneously he perceived himself to be one
person in one place again. However, he noted a
clumsiness and weakness of the entire right half of
Fig. 2 – Artist’s drawing according to PH’s verbal
description of four of his five doubles. All doubles were
invariably located to the right of the patient’s body. Despite
nobody of the “family” of doubles reflected the patients’
appearance, all members were felt to belong to the own self. The
degree of motor and psychological autonomy of a double
increased with increasing distance from PH’s body. The presence
of one additional figure was vaguely perceived (more ‘sensed’
than seen) at a distance of about 20 meters from the patient (not
displayed). The space toward the patient’s right side appeared to
be stretched.
his body. As soon as his wife moved from his side,
all imaginary persons would immediately reappear
in their respective places. Despite considerable
agitation, PH managed to fall asleep after some
two hours. According to the retrospective account
of the patient’s wife, his speech was barely
understandable throughout and contained many
neologisms.
On being specifically questioned about details
of his experience, the patient reported that the
initially present “gap” between the two halves of
his body was only felt, but not seen. Also later on,
he always saw his own body in a regular way, and
the bodies of the illusory family members were
seen complete as well (i.e., visualization was not
restricted to their upper parts or to head and face).
At no time did the patient have the specific feeling
of being separated from his body. His perspective
was thus continuously centered on his own body,
although the patient noted that by referring to “a
feeling of being awfully frittered away” (see
above), he wanted to emphasize that his general
bodily awareness was “distorted” and the identity
of body and mind was “altered” (he had difficulties
in finding the accurate words to describe this state,
which we will refer to as ‘depersonalization’ in the
Discussion section).
The next morning the patient was brought to a
local hospital. Initially, he was still aphasic, and he
continued to be accompanied by the “family”.
However, he could no longer see the different
persons. He rather felt their presence, that is,
“some hardly describable sense” made him aware
that the “family” was still present and enabled him
to precisely localize the position of four persons in
his room. Specifically, he noticed that the “father”
had moved to the right while the distance to the
“girls” had shrunk, such that the “family” now
gathered at a distance of 2 to 3 meters from his
side with the exception of the “son”, who had
disappeared. The patient no longer identified
himself primarily with the “father” but felt that
each member of the “family” was equally a “part
of [his] expanded self”. They jointly continued to
mirror his own movements. Later the same day,
they began to communicate with him (by
transferring their thoughts to him rather than by
normal means of verbal communication).
Throughout, the messages he received consisted of
comforting statements preoccupied with the theme
of death and dying. The patient indicated that these
communications reassured him of the harmless
character of his condition. Paradoxically, he also
noted that they made him seriously consider the
possibility of an afterlife.
“Again and again they said I had such a lovely
wife that, should I die, she would find a new
partner in no time. Rather than making me jealous,
these words really comforted me and reassured me
in my feeling that nothing really harmful could
ever happen to me”.
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For the rest of the day and during the second
day in the hospital, the invisible family remained
to the patient’s right side except when someone
spoke with him. After awakening on the morning
of the third day, the patient noticed that all the
imaginary persons had disappeared. They did not
reappear, either preoperatively or postoperatively. A
formal postoperative examination was denied by
the patient, who preferred to stay with his closest
relatives “in order to prepare himself for dying”.
He passed away 16 months following surgery.
DISCUSSION
The patient presented here experienced polyopic
heautoscopy in the right hemispace as the first
manifestation of a left-sided tumor. The clinical
features are consistent with previous reports.
Heautoscopy has frequently been described in
patients with focal seizures due to cerebral
neoplasias (e.g., Dewhurst and Pearson, 1955;
Hécaen and de Ajuriaguerra, 1952). Although the
primary lesion location may be the parietal lobes
(Menninger-Lerchenthal, 1935, 1946; Hécaen and
de Ajuriaguerra, 1952), the temporal lobes
(Devinsky et al., 1989; Dening and Berrios, 1994),
or occipital areas (Bhaskaran et al., 1990; Zamboni
et al., 2005), focal damage to the temporo-parietal
junction of either hemisphere has been emphasized
both in the classic literature (Menninger-
Lerchenthal, 1935, 1946) as well as in most recent
case studies (Blanke et al., 2004). The lesion of the
present patient is consistent with these findings.
This invasive tumor probably originated in the
posterior insula, was especially destructive of the
left temporal lobe, but extended laterally into both
parietal and frontal lobe. Some of these areas have
recently been identified as part of the “cortical
midline structures” intimately related to the
experience of the self (Northoff and Bermpohl,
2004). Damage to the insular cortex may be
particularly relevant since this region is reportedly
involved in action simulation and the adoption of a
viewpoint different from the regular, i.e., body-
centered perspective (Ruby and Decety, 2001).
Also, both temporoparietal junction and posterior
insula were identified as key structures of
vestibular projection areas (Fasold et al., 2002) and
thus important to visuo-spatial orientation and the
localization of the body in space.
Several observations emphasize the importance
of non-visual, body-related mechanisms for the
genesis of heautoscopy. These include, first, the
presence of depersonalization as a general alteration
of emotional and bodily self-awareness, which in
the present case was described as an alienation
from his own body, accompanied by dizziness and,
later on, a feeling of being “awfully frittered away”.
Similar alterations in corporeal awareness were
previously reported as concomitants of heautoscopy
(Menninger-Lerchenthal, 1935; Hécaen and de
Ajuriaguerra, 1952; Blanke et al., 2004). 
Second, there were specific somatognosic
disorders such as the splitting of the own body at
the median. The experience of oneself as
“inhabiting” two halves of a body, spatially
separated by a gap, is frequently associated with
lesions of the parietal lobes (Critchley, 1955/1979,
pp. 92-105; Gloning et al., 1954, case 1), but also
described in patients with a psychotic disorder,
either with (Müller-Erzbach, 1951, p. 90) or
without accompanying episodes of heautoscopy
(Bozic and Vujic, 1930). There may be a gradual
transition from the feeling of having one body split
into two halves to the personification of a split
half-body as a double of oneself. Similar
transformations can be observed in cases of
hemiasomatognosia, i.e. the illusion that one half
of one’s body has ceased to exist (e.g., Blanke et
al., 2003; Lunn, 1970, cases 1 and 2; Menninger-
Lerchenthal, 1946). In some cases, the apparent
nonexistence of one-half of the body is
accompanied by somatoparaphrenic delusions about
“somebody else” taking its place (e.g., Ley and
Stauder, 1950, p. 573; Zingerle, 1913). The initial
split into two distinct halves of the body in our
patient resembles the experience of Klages’ (1959)
patient with a focal left-parietal lesion (case 8 in
our Table I). This patient reported that it appeared
to him “as if my self consists of three parts, i.e.,
my proper self, a left and a right side, hence
together three parts that vehemently shy away from
unification” (p. 267). Unlike in our case, this
patient’s most prominent self observed the struggle
between the two remaining selves to become united
from an apparently disembodied perspective.
A third point, emphasizing the primarily non-
visual nature of heautoscopy involves PH’s
identification with the different “family members”
despite the absence of visual similarity to the
patient’s appearance. In this context, Sollier (1903)
coined the term “dissimilar heautoscopy”
(‘héautoscopie dissemblable’), noting that the
relative unimportance of visual content
differentiates heautoscopy from autoscopic
hallucinations (‘hallucinations spéculaires’). An
earlier and analogous classification of autoscopic
phenomena according to the visual (dis)similarity
between patient and double had been proposed by
Hagen (1837), who differentiated “autoscopy” from
“deuteroscopy”. In our case, three of the patient’s 5
doubles were of the opposite sex (‘heterosexual
heautoscopy’, after Letailleur et al., 1958). This
lack of correspondence in the gender of patient and
doppelgänger was previously described exclusively
in the course of a psychotic illness (e.g., Carp,
1952; Letailleur et al., 1958), and we know of no
other case of polyopic heautoscopy in which some
of the doubles were of the same sex as the patient
and some of the opposite sex (c.f., Table I). There
were relatively few similarities between our patient
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and his “closest” double (the ‘gentleman’ to his
right). Yet, the patient had a strong “feeling of
belonging” towards him, and it appeared to him
that the two of them shared thoughts and feelings.
A unique feature of the present case is the
functional relationship between spatial and
psychological phenomenology. In fact, the
imaginary figures localized at greater distances
from the patient’s body were only detected after
inspection of the “closest” double and labeled
“lady” (or, sometimes, ‘wife’) and “daughters”.
Feelings of identity were less pronounced for the
“lady” (distance of 2 meters) compared to the
“gentleman” along the right side of the patients
body, and for the “daughters” (distance of 6
meters) they were even less prominent. The “son”
(20 meters) had always played a minor role, was at
a significantly greater distance than the rest of the
“family” and was also the first figure to disappear
completely. Autoscopic and heautoscopic doubles
are generally experienced in the near personal
space (Blanke et al., 2004) and only rarely
localized at a distance far beyond grasping space
(Dewhurst and Pearson, 1955; Lukianowicz, 1958,
case B; Arenz, 2001; Blanke et al., 2004, case 1).
For these more distant doubles, self-recognition
and self-identification were rather vague and often
only experienced once double and patient
approached one another (e.g., Lubowska, 1892;
McCulloch, 1992).
Most earlier cases of heautoscopic echopraxia
(Dewhurst and Pearson, 1955, cases 1 and 2;
Lukianowicz, 1958, cases A and D) concerned a
single double, and a correlation between perceived
distance and the extent of echopraxia could not be
assessed. In the present case, echopraxia was
explicitly tested by the intrigued patient and found
to be strongest and most closely matching his own
body movements for the “gentleman” close by,
followed by the “lady” and only occasionally by
the two “daughter-doubles” at a greater distance.
The patient’s movements were never imitated by
the most distant “son”. This distance-related
relationship between the patient’s motor actions or
intentions and those of his doubles may be causally
related to the interdependence between felt
psychological identification and perceived physical
distance. We have pointed out that the spatial
characteristics of heautoscopy may be an important
predictor of the psychological content of the
reduplicative experience (Brugger, 2002). While we
previously emphasized the aspect of spatial and
psychological perspective taking, we now propose
that experienced physical distance of illusory
reduplications of one’s body may systematically
interact with motor, visual and cognitive variables.
Spatial-psychological interactions may be
particularly evident in polyopic heautoscopy where
multiple doubles with different characteristics are
experienced simultaneously at different locations in
phenomenal space.
Another link between spatial and psychological
phenomenology is suggested by the present case.
PH’s doubles had a clearly comforting role. They
made him feel secure by suggesting the possibility
of a personal afterlife and by assuring him that his
real family would not fall apart, even in the most
serious case of his death. The patient’s marked and
lasting anosodiaphoria and the positive attitude of
his illusory companions seem to have nourished
one another. Although speculative, we wish to
point to a possible association between emotional
content of a heautoscopic episode and the
hemispace in which the reduplication or
multiplication takes place. In several previous
reports of unilateral autoscopic phenomena,
affectively positive or at least neutral interactions
were described for a doppelgänger confined to the
right hemispace (e.g., Féré, 1890, case 13; Pailhas,
1908, case 1; Sivadon, 1937, case 2; Hécaen and
de Ajuriaguerra, 1952, case 83; Brugger et al.,
1996, case 2). In contrast, left hemispace
lateralization is often accompanied with hostile
interactions between patient and double (Carp,
1952; van Bogaert, 1934; Spiers et al., 1992) and
associated with depressed mood and suicidal
ideation (Persinger, 1994). This interaction between
the left and the right sides of space on the one
hand, and the emotional valence of an experience
on the other, is reminiscent of the morbid dislike of
and aggression toward a dysfunctional limb
(‘misoplegia’; Critchley, 1955/1979), which is more
evident in left-sided as compared to right-sided
hemiplegia. Likewise, in the syndrome of the
anarchic limb (Marchetti and Della Sala, 1998),
self-destructive behaviors are more frequently
ascribed to left-sided compared to right-sided
extremities (Brugger, 2001, for the references).
Additional case analyses are needed to corroborate
the present conclusion concerning a relationship
between lateralization and affective meaning of
illusory reduplications of one’s own body. One
alternative to this conclusion is to conceive of PH’s
doubles as a sign of transitivism (Wernicke, 1900),
i.e. the comforting externalization of self-
threatening information and its projection onto
other persons, whether real or imaginary (Brugger,
2002 for overview). We note that in 3 out of the 14
cases of polyopic heautoscopy listed in Table I,
transitivistic tendencies were apparent (case n. 3, 5
and 12). In any case, the location of hallucinations
in space, previously linked to relatively low-level
sensorimotor preferences of an individual (e.g.,
Girard and Cheyne, 2004), may be associated in
significant ways with higher-order psychological
states as well.
We can only speculate which mechanisms might
have led to PH’s experience of multiple doubles. It
may be relevant that he observed initially only one
right-sided double. Yet, once he had moved his eyes
beyond the imaginary figure immediately adjacent to
his body, he discovered the additional doubles more
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to the right. In hemianopia, eye-movements toward
the visual field defect were shown to elicit polyopia
(Gottlieb, 1992). On the other hand, impaired
control of eye movements is considered a major
pathomechanism in classical polypopia (Bender,
1945; but see Cornblath et al., 1998, for alternative
mechanisms). On this account, polyopia is assumed
to result from aberrant involuntary eye movements
that accompany fixation and thus lead to multiple
representations of an observed (or hallucinated)
object. 
However, similarities between polyopia in the
sense of a purely visual perseveration and the
experience of multiple doubles in polyopic
heautoscopy should not be overemphasized. It is
highly probable that the primary multiplication
originated in the somatosensory domain, and that the
present case thus represents an instance of
“polyesthesia”. What was visually experienced as
the “family” by our patient may thus represent the
secondary visual interpretation of a fragmentation of
his bodily self (Zamboni et al., 2005, for a similar
interpretation of a case of autoscopy). Heautoscopy,
whether a reduplicative or multiplicative experience,
may thus reflect a disintegration of those processes
that normally allow the continuous experience of
having a body to which we “bind” our self
(Metzinger, 2003; Northoff and Bermpohl, 2004). As
in the phenomenon of the supernumerary phantom
limb, where patients may experience multiplications
rather than duplications of an extremity (Vuilleumier
et al., 1997; Brugger, 2003, for an overview), “the
person within” (Damasio, 2003), set temporarily free
during autoscopic phenomena, may not necessarily
be experienced as an indivisible unit.
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